

Message Text

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INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

CINCEUR

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USDEL USSCC GENEVA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USMISSION NATO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 1931

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: SOVIET JOURNALS ON SALT

CINCEUR, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, SHAPE,
FOR POLADS

REF: A. MOSCOW 1770 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. THE FEBRUARY ISSUES OF BOTH THE USA JOURNAL AND THE
JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (MEMO) CARRY MAJOR ARTICLES ON VLADIVOSTOK AND SALT-II.
USA INSTITUTE STRATEGIC EXPERT M.A. MIL'SHTEYN IN HIS INSTITUTE'S
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JOURNAL, AND ANOTHER USA INSTITUTE STRATEGIST, G.A. TROFIMENKI,

IN THE IMEMO JOURNAL, BOTH EMPHASIZE THAT AVOIDANCE OF WAR IS THE LINCHPIN OF THE NEW U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THEY PRAISE THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING AS LAYING NECESSARY GROUNDWORK FOR A SALT-II AGREEMENT, THOUGH BOTH NOTE THAT SOME PROBLEMS, WHICH THEY DO NOT SPECIFY, REMAIN TO BE SOLVED.

2. BOTH AUTHORS EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIRV PARITY PROVIDED FOR BY THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD. MIL'SHTEYN CONTENTS THAT THE TEN-YEAR TIME FRAME WILL "STOP" THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, SINCE TEN YEARS IS APPROXIMATELY THE PERIOD REQUIRED TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY SUCH WEAPONS. TROFIMENKO SEES THE TIME FRAME AS ADEQUATE TO "CONSOLIDATE PARITY" AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS. HE SEES THE ACCORD AS HAVING CREATED "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" AS WELL AS ACTUAL EQUIVALENCE IN NUMBER OF WARHEADS. HE SAYS THAT NEW NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE BEGUN "WITHOUT DELAY" (PRESUMABLY HE MEANS AFTER A SALT-II AGREEMENT, THOUGH HE DOES NOT SAY SO) ON FURTHER LIMITS AND POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS.

3. BOTH AUTHORS GO TO SOME LENGTHS TO DETAIL HOW DIFFICULT THE PROCESS OF REACHING THE STAGE OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT SIGNIFIED BY THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD HAS BEEN. INTERESTINGLY, EX-LT. GENERAL MIL'SHTEYN'S ARTICLE IS LESS HARSH IN LAYING THE BLAME ON THE U.S. FOR DELAYS THAN IS THE TROFIMENKO ARTICLE, WHICH OCCASIONALLY IS STRIDENT IN DESCRIBING WHY PROGRESS TOWARD A SALT-II UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN "VERY SLOW." BUT THEY GO TO EQUAL LENGTHS IN MAKING A CASE FOR GROWING STABILITY IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS AVOIDANCE OF WAR. IN DOING SO, BOTH RELY HEAVILY ON THE CORRELATION OF FORCES ARGUMENT, CONTENDING THAT THE GROWING MIGHT OF THE "SOCIALIST STATES" HAS FORCED THE U.S. INTO NEGOTIATIONS. IN SUM, BOTH ARTICLES EMPHASIZE THE CONTINUING INTEREST OF THE TWO NATIONS IN ARMS CONTROL MEASURES; AT THE SAME TIME, BOTH UNDERLINE THE THESIS USUALLY EXPRESSED UNDER THE RUBRIC OF THE "UNCHANGING AGGRESSIVE NATURE OF IMPERIALISM" IN PORTRAYING THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN REACHING ARMS ACCORDS WITH THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

4. BOTH TROFIMENKO AND MIL'SHTEYN EMPHASIZE THAT AVOIDANCE OF WAR IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE NEW SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. TROFIMENKO ALSO STRESSES THAT THE PRINCIPAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD IS ITS CLEAR EXPRESSION OF THE DETERMINA-CONFIDENTIAL

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OF BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR RELATIONS. THE USSR, HE CLAIMS, "WAS AND REMAINS AN UNWAVERING ADVOCATE" OF SUCH A POLICY.

5. TROFIMENKO ARGUES THAT IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE "HISTORICAL IMPERATIVE" OF AVOIDING WAR, BOTH NATIONS HAD TO MOVE TO THROTTLE THE ARMS RACE. HE SAYS THAT MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN TO THAT END -- LTBT, THE NPT, THE 1972 CONVENTION OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, THE

SOVIET UNGA PROPOSALS ON BUDGET REDUCTION AND ENMOD, AND CCD DELIBERATIONS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE -- ARE LAUDABLE, BUT INSUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES TO LIMIT THE ARMS RACE. ONLY LIMITS ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE CAN DO THAT. HE CONTENTS FURTHER THAT NEGOTIATION ON SUCH LIMITS HAD TO WAIT UNTIL THE U.S. WAS CONVINCED THAT ITS EFFORTS TO ATTAIN UNCONTESTED STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY HAD PROVED FRUITLESS. MIL'SHTEYN MAKES MUCH THE SAME POINT IN HIS ARTICLE, ARGUING THAT THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE HAD TO BE STOPPED BECAUSE IT FED THE FIRES OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE AS WELL.

6. TROFIMENKO WRITES THAT THE PRACTICAL MEASURES WHICH HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TOWARD AVOIDANCE OF A NUCLEAR WAR (THE HOT LINE AGREEMENT, THE 1971 AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT, AND THE PNW) ARE INDICATIVE OF A "VERY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE" IN THE VIEWS OF U.S. POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS. THESE LEADERS, HE CONTENTS, BEGAN TO APPROACH THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MORE CAUTIOUSLY AS EARLY AS THE 1960'S BUT AT THAT TIME STILL BELIEVED THAT "MUTUAL DETERRENCE" ALLOWED THEM TO USE THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES FREELY, LEADING TO THEIR "UNLEASHING OF WAR AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM." TROFIMENKO CONTINUES THAT NOW, HOWEVER, AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND STRATEGISTS ARE FORCED TO ADMIT THAT THERE IS NO "WATERSHED" BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CONFLICTS. THEY NOW ADMIT THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD OF AVOIDANCE OF NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT THROUGH DEPENDENCE OF ARTIFICIAL "THRESHOLDS OF MILITARY ESCALATION", BUT RATHER THROUGH AVOIDANCE OF USE OF FORCE OF ANY TYPE, AS WELL AS AVOIDANCE OF THE THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE. (COMMENT: TROFIMANKO'S ARTICLE WAS SIGNED TO PRESS ON JANUARY 20. HIS OMISSION OF REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY'S BUSINESS WEEK INTERVIEW IN THIS CONTEXT IS SURPRISING. END COMMENT).

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INFO OCT-01 ACDA-05 ISO-00 SAJ-01 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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CINCEUR
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7. NEITHER TROFIMENKO NOR MIL'SHTEYN DISCUSSES AT ANY LENGTH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD. MIL'SHTEYN DOES BRIEFLY OUTLINE ITS MAIN FEATURES. IN HIS DISCUSSION HE NOTES THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMMON CEILING ON MIRV LAUNCHERS. HE CALLS MIRV'S "ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE" (A QUALIFICATION WHICH IN ALL PROBABILITY REFERS TO HIS OFT-EXPRESSED PREOCCUPATION WITH ACCURACY AS ANOTHER IMPORTANT QUALITATIVE FACTOR). TROFIMENKO ALSO EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF MIRV PARITY. MIL'SHTEYN SAYS THAT THE TEN-YEAR TERM OF THE AGREEMENT WILL STABILIZE AND FAVORABLY AFFECT U.S-SOVIET RELATIONS, A BELIEF ECHOED BY TROFIMENKO. MIL'SHTEYN ADDS THAT "THESE LIMITS (PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO THE TERM OF VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT) WILL STOP THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS RACE, FOR DEVELOPMENT, CONFIDENTIAL

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PRODUCTION, AND DEPLOYMENT OF THESE WEAPONS, EXPERIENCE SHOWS, REQUIRES APPROXIMATELY TEN YEARS."

8. THOUGH BOTH ARTICLES ARE OPTIMISTIC ON THE PROSPECTS FOR SALT-II, MIL'SHTEYN SOUNDS A CAUTIONARY NOTE BY COMMENTING THAT "THERE WERE AND STILL ARE COMPLICATIONS, NOT ONLY OF A POLITICAL NATURE, BUT ALSO OF A SO-CALLED TECHNICAL NATURE AS WELL." THOUGH HE GOES ON TO EXPLAIN THAT THE ADJECTIVE "SO-CALLED" REFERS TO HIS THESIS THAT EVEN TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO AND CAN BE OVERRIDEN BY POLITICAL DECISION, HE DOES NOT EXPLAIN WHAT "COMPLICATIONS" HE HAS IN MIND. HE NOTES FURTHER THAT "IN ORDER TO WORK OUT THE FINAL TEXT OF THE TREATY, AGREEMENT STILL HAS TO BE REACHED ON A SERIES OF TECHNICAL, AND NOT ONLY TECHNICAL, PROBLEMS." TROFIMENKO ALSO NOTES THAT "NO SMALL NUMBER OF COMPLEX FACTORS" REMAIN TO BE SOLVED.

9. TROFIMENKO WRITES THAT AGREED PRINCIPLES ON THE SALT-II

NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDE THE PROVISION THAT THE TREATY WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL 1975 "SINCE SUCH A PERIOD WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY LONG TO CONSOLIDATE PARITY (ZAKREPIT' REVNOVESIYE) IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND CREATE THE NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS FOR FURTHER MEASURES TO REDUCE SUCH WEAPONS." WRITING FOR HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, HE MAKES IT APPEAR THAT BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE TO CUT FORCES TO MEET THE LAUNCHER CEILING: "EACH SIDE, CAN, AT ITS DISCRETION, THROUGH SMALL REDUCTIONS ESTABLISH THE TOTALS OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE COMMON OVERALL CEILING." HE CONTENDS THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD HAS REMOVED THE "ARTIFICIALLY MAGNIFIED" PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCES IN THROW-WEIGHT (SEE PARA 10 BELOW). HE CONCLUDES THAT THE MAJORITY OF AMERICAN SPECIALISTS NOW AGREE THAT "THE EVENING OUT OF THE LEVELS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY" IN THE TWO COUNTRIES PROVIDES "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE (RAVNOVESIYE PO SUSHCHESTVU) AS WELL AS EQUIVALENCE IN THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL WARHEADS." SUPPORTING OTHER INDICATIONS WE HAVE SEEN (REF A) THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE READY TO MOVE QUICKLY AFTER SALT-II TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, HE WRITES THAT AT VLADIVOSTOK "IT WAS AGREED TO BEGIN, WITHOUT DELAY, NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITS AND POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS." (THOUGH TROFIMENKO DOES NOT EXPLICITLY SAY THAT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MUST WAIT UNTIL AFTER SALT-II, WE ASSUME FROM OTHER STATEMENTS (REF A, INTER ALIA) THAT THAT IS THE SOVIET VIEW.)

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10. BOTH THE TROFIMENKO AND THE MIL'SHTEYN ARTICLES DEVOTE MUCH SPACE TO AN EXPLANATION OF WHY NEGOTIATIONS ON SALT-II HAVE TAKEN SO LONG. MIL'SHTEYN CONTENDS THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE NATURAL DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN ATTEMPTING TO SOLVE SUCH A COMPLEX PROBLEM, THERE WERE TWO MAIN REASONS. FIRST, HE REFERS TO VARIOUS INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE U.S., NAMING THE WATERGATE AFFAIR. MIL'SHTEYN CONTENDS THAT THE SECOND MAIN CAUSE OF THE DELAY WAS THE UNENDING DEBATE IN THE U.S. OVER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS POSED IN SALT. DURING THE DELAY, DETENTE OPPONENTS LOST NO TIME IN EFFORT TO GAIN MORE BARGAINING CHIPS, PRIMARILY THROUGH FORCING DEVELOPMENT OF TRIDENT AND THE B-1. MIL'SHTEYN ENDS HIS POLEMIC, HOWEVER, BY NOTING THAT THROUGH "TREMENDOUS EFFORT, WISDOM, AND FARSIGHTEDNESS, NOT TO MENTION GOOD WILL," CRITERIA WERE CHOSEN AT VLADIVOSTOK "WHICH ...BEST ANSWER AT THE SAME TIME THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY" AND WHICH WOULD "LEAD TO COMPREHENSIVE LIMITATIONS" AND IN THE FUTURE "TO REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS."

11. TROFIMENKO ALSO REFERS TO WATERGATE IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALLEGED DELAY IN REACHING AGREEMENT, BUT CONTENDS THAT THE "VERY SLOW PROGRESS" TOWARD SALT-II HAS BEEN PRIMARILY CAUSED BY REFUSAL OF THE U.S. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX TO AGREE TO A

POSITION OF PARITY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THOSE CRITICS WHO ATTACKED THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, TROFIMENKO EXPLAINS, DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION STRATEGIC BOMBERS, QUALITATIVE PARAMETERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, OR "SEVERAL OTHER FACTORS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT" IN ESTABLISHING PARITY. THESE CRITICS, TROFIMENKO CHARGES, ALSO "WHIPPED UP FEAR" OF THE SUPERIOR "USABLE LOAD" OF SOVIET ICBM'S, IGNORING THE LIFT CAPABILITIES OF TITAN-2, OF TRIDENT-1 AND TRIDENT-2, AND THE MINUTEMAN "OF A NEW TYPE NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION" WHICH EXCEEDS THE "USEABLE LOAD" CAPABILITY OF THE MINUTEMAN-3 BY A FACTOR OF 3 OR 4; TROFIMENKO FOOTNOTES HIS USE OF THE TERM "USABLE LOAD" WITH A CHARGE THAT THE PENTAGON DOES NOT USE THE CLEAR TERM "USABLE LOAD," BUT RATHER "THROW WEIGHT," IN WHICH U.S. EXPERTS HAVE NEVER ATTEMPTED TO DEFINE EXACTLY WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE PAYLOAD ARE INCLUDED.

12. BOTH MIL'SHTEYN AND TROFIMENKO CITE WIDE OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE U.S. FOR THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD, WITH BOTH
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EMPHASIZING THAT "EVEN" SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAS CALLED THE AGREEMENT A SUBSTANTIAL STEP FORWARD. TROFIMENKO EXPRESSED OPINION THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD ITSELF WILL LEAD TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHILE MIL'SHTEYN SAYS THE SAME WILL RESULT FROM SIGNING OF THE SALT-II AGREEMENT ITSELF.
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